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Introduction
As of July 2012, Greece is in the middle
of a full-blown economic crisis, partly due to
inherent flaws in economic policy and partly due
to the inflexible stipulations of its member-
ship in the European Union. Economic growth
during the last decade masked the gravity of
Greece’s external imbalances and inefficien-
cies in the public sector, which were undermin-
ing its competitiveness and debt sustainabil-
ity. The announcement that Greece’s budget
deficit was grossly underestimated (15.4 percent
rather 5.1 percent) in 2009 by the newly elected
PASOK government instigated a series of
unprecedented interventionist actions from
Eurozone members, European authorities,
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
(EEAG, p. 97). Since 2009, Greece has been bat-
tling a crisis in investor confidence that has
barred it from international bond markets for
over 4 years, making it impossible for the coun-
try to service its fiscal needs on its own.
As a member of the EU, Greece cannot
devalue its currency, which could have improved
export competitiveness, and cannot imple-
ment its own monetary policy, as the U.S. did
with “quantitative easing.” Thus, in order to aid
the Greek government with its financing needs,
the IMF, the European Central Bank (ECB), and
the European Commission (EC), frequently
known collectively as the “Troika,” offered a
bailout package of €110 billion on May 10, 2010.
In return for loans that will be disbursed quar-
terly over a three-year period, the Greek govern-
ment agreed to execute an ambitious macroeco-
nomic adjustment plan. Fiscal austerity
measures were introduced to restore public
finances, while structural reforms were initiated
to spur growth and increase competitiveness 
by means of an internal depreciation (Garcia 
Pascaul and Ghezzi, p. 4).
These and other measures, however, have
not yet alleviated the financial situation in
Greece, nor have they mollified apprehensive
Eurozone members who have poured billions of
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euros into loan assistance. Despite initial
progress with pension and labor-market
reforms, a grueling recession along with the
effects of austerity measures have caused Greece
to miss the fiscal targets set under the agree-
ment with the Troika, and its deficit and debt
levels remain abnormally high. As of June 2011,
public debt stood at €354 billion (Tsoukalis, 
p. 20) and current account deficit totaled €21.1
billion (Kontogiannis, 2012). Implementation
of key reforms and policies by the govern-
ment, such as the privatization of public enter-
prises, has also lagged behind. Coupled with a
flight of Greek depositors to foreign banks
(equal to 20 percent of deposits since 2010) and
a heavy dependence on ECB funding by Greek
banks, contraction in economic activity has
caused further shrinking of investor confidence
(Garcia Pascaul and Ghezzi, p. 1). By fall of 2011
it was clear, based on all macroeconomic indi-
cators, that Greece would fail to be on a sustain-
able path by the initial target date of June 2013,
as set by the first memorandum.
Since there was neither a legal mechanism
nor the will by either the European Commission
or Greece for a Greek exit from EU, and since
an uncontrolled Greek default would have led
to further credit freeze-ups and bank runs,
another €130 billion loan agreement was nego-
tiated in October 2011. As a prerequisite for
these new funds, private bond holders, such as
banks, were asked to agree to a 50 percent “hair-
cut” or write-down on private debt holdings.
However, this renegotiated memorandum has
not been enough to quell the uncertainty sur-
rounding Greece’s debt sustainability as its debt
burden remains significant. Greece’s track
record so far has shown that fiscal consolidation
together with debt restructuring are not enough
to fix its insolvency and competitiveness prob-
lems. In order to put Greece on a path of debt
sustainability, fiscal and structural reforms
are also necessary to help promote growth
and equity, but only if implemented successfully
(OECD, 2011). The uncertainty of Greece’s
fate continues to affect financial markets around
the world, and many policymakers are worried
about how the outcome in Greece will affect the
crises in other peripheral Eurozone countries,
such as Ireland and Portugal, where the IMF
is also intervening. This issue has fuelled intense
debate over whether the IMF, ECB, and EC are
responding to the crisis optimally, and whether
the revised Memorandum of Understanding
(as of February 2012) will help place Greece
on a sustainable path by 2020. 
This article explores both the debt crisis in
Greece and the response taken by the IMF, ECB,
and Eurozone members. Section two analyzes
the factors that led Greece to the crisis, includ-
ing the upsurge of public debt since entry into
the European Monetary Union (EMU) and vul-
nerabilities in the economy that undermined 
its competitiveness. Section three discusses 
the intervention of the Troika in 2010 and the
corrective measures and targets in the Memo-
randum of Understanding as well as the under-
lying rationale behind them. Section four pres-
ents the current situation in Greece and the
factors that led to a worsening of Greece’s
debt and failure of the first agreement. Sec-
tion five then examines the second bailout pack-
age and complementary debt restructuring and
discusses whether it will be enough to lead
Greece on a path of debt sustainability.
The lessons learned from understanding
the nature of this crisis will be useful when
viewed through the lens of different Eurozone
countries that have similar fiscal and solvency
issues. By isolating the proximate and histori-
cal factors that influenced the development of
its debt crisis, as well as how Greece attempted
to deal with the solvency issue at hand, we
can come to a concrete understanding of
whether Greece is an isolated case among
over-indebted peripheral countries in the euro
area, or if it is the first in a case of a domino
effect originating from a flawed system design. 
Background: A History of Low
Competitiveness and High Debt
In May 2010, Greece entered into an agree-
ment with the Troika that it thought would
establish financial stability and restore market
confidence after a decade of unsustainable
economic growth and buildup of large exter-
nal and fiscal imbalances. These escalating
imbalances led to burgeoning twin deficits
and accelerated external and public debt.
Since its entrance into the Eurozone,
Greece has suffered from a large current-
account deficit, signaling that imports are too
high and its exports too low, and from rising
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wages, despite stagnant productivity. Demand
in Greece surged over the period 2000 to 2009
thanks to increases in private and public con-
sumption and residential investment, averaging
four percent of real GDP growth per year com-
pared to two percent for the rest of the Euro-
zone. However, this increase in consumption
has not been balanced by a complementary
increase in exports. Greece’s service exports, for
example, which form a large portion of total
exports, were heavily impacted by the global cri-
sis. Earnings from transportation services, for
example, were equal to total earnings from
exports of goods in 2008. By 2009, however,
earnings from transportation services had fallen
by 30 percent. In addition, thirty years of heavy
public expenditure, along with low real interest
rates from joining the euro area in 2001 and
loose budget restraints, also fueled an increase
in real wages and credit growth. However, these
increases in real wages were not driven by
productivity gains, but were followed instead by
increases in unit labor costs. Greek unit labor
costs, a key metric of competitiveness, consis-
tently followed behind that of the Eurozone.
Greece also faces a host of structural
inefficiencies in its labor and product mar-
kets. For example, Greece possesses one of the
strictest set of employment protection regula-
tions in the Eurozone, making it difficult to fire
employees. Low productivity coupled with low
employment also compromised competitive-
ness. Furthermore, Greece’s net national sav-
ings rate has dramatically declined since 1988
and even turned negative after adopting the
euro, reflecting high rates of public and pri-
vate consumption (Favaro, Li, Pradelli, and Van
Doorn, 2011, p. 223). Together, this decline in
the national savings rate and Greece’s low exter-
nal competitiveness have led to a widening of
the current account deficit and increase in net
foreign indebtedness since the adoption of the
euro. By 2008, the current account deficit had
doubled from 7 percent in 1999 (Favaro et al.,
2011, p. 223) to 14 percent of GDP (“Euro-
pean Commission,” p. 3).
In addition to these imbalances, Greece
ran a costly public sector that led to accumu-
lation of large government and external debt.
Greece has a long history of using high public
expenditure to fuel its economy. In particular,
government spending was largely composed of
social transfers, compensation for public
employees (which increased to 12.7 percent of
GDP in 2009 from 8 percent in 1976) and pen-
sion benefits (11.7 percent of GDP in 2009
and expected to grow to over 19 percent by
2035) (EEAG, pp. 100–101). In fact, many pub-
lic-sector positions were unionized and offered
lifetime job security, thereby diminishing the
incentive for employees to increase their pro-
ductivity. Many of these positions also had over-
lapping responsibilities and were significantly
fragmented. For example, there was once an
instance where 13 Ministries took part in 27
tourism-related activities (McKinsey & Com-
pany, p. 20). Politicians used these “cradle to the
grave” jobs as a means of decreasing unemploy-
ment and providing thousands of public sec-
tor jobs to the electorate, thereby guarantee-
ing re-election. By 2010, government employees
accounted for 17.3 percent of total employment
and their real wages were consistently higher
than real wages in the private sector. Indeed,
real wages of civil servants and employees in
public enterprises outpaced wages in other 
sectors (EEAG, p. 101). This tendency to outbid
private-sector wages further deteriorated 
competitiveness.
It comes as no surprise that such a bureau-
cratic system would be a center for ineffective
resource utilization and delays in business oper-
ations. State-run enterprises were also ineffec-
tive and ran huge deficits. For example, total
debt for the state-run railway company Hellenic
Railways increased to $13 billion, or 5 percent
of GDP, in 2010 from 3 percent of GDP in 2009
(Thomas, 2010). The railway system and other
public enterprises relied heavily on subsidies
and borrowing from the government, and orig-
inally Greece was able to keep these liabilities1
off its balance sheet. However, when Greece was
forced to record these off-budget liabilities after
joining the Eurozone, its debt-to-GDP greatly
increased (EEAG, pp. 106–107). Moreover, this
type of public spending created a sense of
dependency on the government because it was
directly fuelling the economy through subsidies
and the creation of public-sector jobs as well
as generous pensions, and indirectly through
105
1These liabilities came in the form of loan guarantees
and “consolidation loans” and were not recorded as govern-
ment debt.
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lax tax enforcement and obstructions to indus-
try. By 2009 the size of the government had
grown from 44 percent in 2000 to 50 percent
of GDP (“European Commission,” pp. 3–4). To
make matters worse, Greece is plagued with
widespread tax evasion (mostly income and pay-
roll taxes) and serious inefficiencies in tax col-
lection, which reduced government revenue
(EEAG, p. 104). By 2009 government revenue
in Greece fell to 37 percent from 43 percent in
2000 (EEAG, p. 102).
Rather than seeking to lessen its debt load
during good times, the Greek government
continued to boost spending to finance its
burgeoning public sector and borrow to finance
its debt, facilitated by low interest rates since
the adoption of the euro. Indeed, since Greece
was under the protective umbrella of the Euro-
zone, borrowing costs remained low since yields
were slow to react to rising deficits and because
deficit debt limit enforcement was weak under
the Stability and Growth Pact.2 By 2009, how-
ever, total government debt increased from 103
percent of GDP in 2000 to 115 percent of GDP
and net external debt rose from 45 percent in
2000 to almost 100 percent of GDP (“Euro-
pean Commission,” p. 6). In addition, Greece’s
negative net international position rose to 98
percent of GDP by 2010 (EEAG, p. 8).
The onset of the global financial crisis in
2007 highlighted these imbalances in Greece,
especially as revised estimates of the budget
deficit were made public. The high levels of pub-
lic and external debt led investors to re-evalu-
ate the risk premium associated with Greece.
Among the many concerns was Greece’s budget
deficit, an astonishingly high 15 percent of GDP
in 2009. This figure is in sharp contrast to the
budget deficits for other troubled countries such
as Portugal and Italy, which were 9.3 percent
and 5.3 percent respectively in 2009 (Cabral,
2010). Seeing that a significant portion of
Greece’s public debt was also held externally,
implying that each interest payment paid to
non-domestic creditors was detrimental,
Greece’s perceived ability to service its debt
worsened. As seen in Figure 1, this concern
led to a surge in yield spreads of EU members’
10-year sovereign-bond issues with respect to
the German bund. Risk premiums, especially for
2Under the Stability and Growth Pact, member state’s
annual budget deficit can be no higher than 3% of GDP and
national debt should be lower than 60% of GDP.
Figure 1
Ten-year interest-rate spreads over German Bunds, September 1992–June 2011
Source: Tsoukalis, Loukas. “Greece in the Euro Area: Odd Man Out or Precursor of Things to Come?” p. 21.
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Greece and other beleaguered peripheral EU
members, rose as investors flocked to assets that
were perceived to be of lower risk (such as the
German bund), thereby making it exceedingly
costly for Greece and other indebted countries
to borrow from debt markets (Gómez-Puiga and
Sosvilla-Rivero, p. 7). The idea that Greece
might default turned into a self-fulfilling
prophecy as downgrades from leading rating
agencies, as well as increases in credit-default
spreads, boosted borrowing costs further, thus
making it impossible for Greece to finance its
considerable fiscal needs. Unable to tap into
international financial markets, Greece could
no longer roll over its debt as it had done before
the crisis. Thus, in order to prevent a sover-
eign default with a heavy contagion risk, Euro-
zone leaders had no choice but to provide
coordinated loans to Greece with the help of the
IMF.
Intervention of the IMF/ECB/EC
As of May 2010, Greece was in a three-year
stand-by arrangement (SBA) with total planned
disbursements from the EU and IMF of €110 bil-
lion, which were meant to cover Greece’s financ-
ing needs until 2013 (EEAG, p. 110). Euro-
zone countries contributed €80 billion in
bilateral loans to this finance package, while the
IMF provided a €30 billion loan. As a condi-
tion of accepting this assistance, which is pro-
vided in quarterly installments, Greece must
adhere to strict conditionality requirements as
outlined in a Memorandum of Understanding.
This conditionality agreement relies on a series
of fiscal consolidation measures and struc-
tural reforms aimed at restoring fiscal solvency,
restoring competitiveness through an internal
depreciation, and creating a healthy environ-
ment for long-term growth (Garcia Pascaul and
Ghezzi, p. 4).
One of the primary objectives of the afore-
mentioned plan3 was to reduce the Greek
budget deficit to below 3 percent of GDP by
2014, from 13.6 percent in 2009 (Nelson, Belkin,
and Mix, p. 4). To this end, fiscal austerity meas-
ures, such as public spending cuts and indi-
rect tax increases, were implemented aiming to
allay the net increase in public debt and secure
medium- and long-term fiscal sustainability
(“European Commission,” p. 10). The pro-
gramme also called for structural fiscal reforms
in the pension system (e.g., cutting retire-
ment age and reducing benefits), public admin-
istration, healthcare (e.g., decreasing public
health expenditure to or below 6 percent of
GDP), and steps to prevent tax evasion. Other
measures taken include: cuts in nominal wages
and pensions (including abolishing the 13th and
14th monthly payments), public investment,
and subsidies to public enterprises; and
increases in value added tax and excise duties on
tobacco and alcohol. Even though fiscal consol-
idation was necessary to bring Greece’s public
finances and deficit under control, there is a
concern that such efforts could greatly exacer-
bate the ongoing recession and lead to further
unemployment at a time when economic
growth is essential.
Indeed, the idea of employing contrac-
tionary fiscal policies during a time of severe
recession is counterintuitive, which begs the
question of how long the Greek government can
pursue such policies before public support fades
completely (Nelson et al., p. 9). As a member
of the Eurozone Greece cannot depreciate its
currency to adjust its trade deficit, nor can it
engage in independent monetary policy. Thus,
the only remaining tools available to Greek pol-
icymakers are to bring their public finances in
line by reducing the number of public-sector
jobs, salaries, benefits, and demand for pri-
vate-sector goods. This set of actions will lead
to repercussions in the private sector since
aggregate demand falls, thus forcing down
wages, incomes, and prices further (EEAG, 
p. 118). Ideally, prices of domestic goods and
services will fall in proportion with income.
With higher prices for imports, Greece’s exports
will become more affordable and thus more
competitive. This theoretical boost in exports
and reduction in imports would lead to a reduc-
tion in Greece’s current-account deficit (EEAG,
p. 118). However, contrary to an external depre-
ciation, whereby Greece’s currency falls imme-
diately, an internal depreciation takes time since
prices and wages are sticky downwards in the
short term (i.e. it takes time for prices to fall).
Thus, until prices react according to changing
economic conditions, there will be a real con-
traction in the economy as it faces falling
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3Known as the Economic Adjustment Programme.
incomes and rising unemployment. Even if
wages and prices do fall eventually to bring
about a reduction in the deficit, an internal
depreciation leaves Greece’s external debt bur-
den unchanged. In a period of recession where
incomes and GDP are falling, an internal deval-
uation could trap Greece’s indebted economy in
a vicious cycle in which its debt-to-GDP ratio
rises because debtors must pay the same inter-
est payments with lower incomes (Krugman,
2011).
Indeed, there is a concern that these fiscal
consolidation efforts will do little to stop
Greece’s ratio of foreign debt to GDP from
increasing (EEAG, p. 118). This concern stems
from the fact that most Greek debt during the
onset of the crisis was held by foreign investors
(79 percent of government gross debt in 2009),
which means that each interest payment made
to non-domestic residents makes Greece poorer
as money leaves the country. This situation
differs from countries such as Italy, for exam-
ple, where the majority of debt was held inter-
nally, interest payments were made within the
country, and thus wealth did not leak out of the
country. Without a significant debt restruc-
turing, interest payments would have continued
to accumulate and cut into GDP. Moreover,
fiscal austerity measures would have hindered
nominal GDP growth, resulting in a worsen-
ing of Greece’s external indebtedness (Cabral,
2010).
Perhaps in light of the aforementioned
risks accompanied by fiscal consolidation
efforts, structural reforms were also introduced
and geared toward increasing Greece’s pro-
ductivity and competitiveness in the long term
and re-launching economic growth in order
to boost investor confidence. Critical reform
areas, as noted by the IMF’s Deputy Managing
Director, included “second-stage labor market
reforms, opening of closed professions, and
deregulation of tourism and retail trade” (“IMF
Completes . . .”). In the first year, Greece suc-
cessfully managed to pass several structural
reforms for correcting labor-market rigidities
and improving labor-market flexibility, espe-
cially in the service sector. One critical reform,
for instance, included the liberalization of
over 108 closed professions such as pharmacists,
notaries, and truckers (Kaskarelis, 2012). Goals
were also set to increase flexibility in the labor
market by reducing hiring and firing costs,
and allowing firm-level employment contracts.
Reforms were also undertaken to restructure
Greece’s healthcare and tax systems, streamline
local government administration, and “establish
monitoring mechanisms for enhanced financial
supervision” (Kaskarelis, 2012). There seemed
to be a general consensus among the public 
in 2010 that unpopular measures such as pay
cuts and reduction of employee benefits and 
severance packages were a necessary evil for
Greece to regain its balance (SKAI, 2011).
Another key area of reform was the privatization
of state-owned enterprises, such as Greece’s
Public Power Corporation (PPC) and other
state-owned assets, in order to decrease govern-
ment expenses. Reforms were also emphasized
in simplifying start-up and licensing procedures
for businesses and approval processes for large
investments.
This was a crucial time for Greece to prove
to investors that it could pass a series of aus-
terity measures and fundamental reforms in
order to demonstrate its commitment to resolv-
ing its crisis and ensure long-term economic
sustainability. Greece has already made con-
siderable headway towards such reforms, but
it seems that the pace of reform is diminish-
ing. This slowdown is happening for a number
of reasons, including: a widening of Greek bond
interest spreads that is dampening investor con-
fidence and jeopardizing deficit reduction plans,
increased uncertainty regarding Euro mem-
ber support amidst domestic political ten-
sions, doubt regarding the sustainability of
the IMF/ECB/EC’s program, and domestic social
pressure due to rising unemployment.
Additional support of €130 billion was
committed to Greece in early 2012, when Euro-
zone leaders deemed Greece to be in need of fur-
ther assistance in light of its deepening reces-
sion (Ahearn, Jackson, Mix, and Nelson, p. 14). 
The aid package differed from the May 2010
package in that it decreased interest burdens,
extended maturities, increased the use of EU
funds aimed at structural reforms, and included
a private sector involvement in the haircut of
Greek debt (Tsoukalis, pp. 26–27). The idea of
private-sector involvement—albeit voluntary—
raised fear that such a move would be deemed
a default by credit agencies, and spreads on
Greek bonds increased twofold.
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How Did the Memorandum of
Understanding of 2010 Fail?
While 2010 was a productive year for
Greece in terms of implementing the IMF’s
mandates, 2011 was fraught with more obsta-
cles. Even though the Greek government
achieved a five percent reduction in its deficit
in 2010 (“From May 2010 to May 2011”), it failed
to meet its fiscal targets for 2011 and was
often criticized for lacking the political will to
implement structural reforms and favoring
more front-loaded tax hikes instead. Indeed, fis-
cal consolidation measures in 2011 were com-
prised of 60 percent tax increases and 40 per-
cent reductions in spending (Provopoulous).
These tax measures, for example, included
increases in VAT rates, multiple special levies on
profitable firms, and large increases in tax rates
on real estate (Visvizi, p. 192). Tax hikes nega-
tively affect investment, as companies face lower
after-tax returns, and after-tax disposable
income falls, which drives down domestic con-
sumption. Reductions in government spending
have also been largely focused on cutting back
public-sector investment and subsidies, which
hampers economic growth. Greece has faced
immense difficulty in trying to orchestrate a
reduction in the number of public sector
employees and it has been slow and inefficient
in its implementation of structural reforms that
it agreed to make (e.g., tax evasion and priva-
tization), thus further decreasing the pro-
gramme’s efficacy. The governor of the Bank
of Greece, George Provopolous, also points to
the fact that fiscal consolidation in Greece has
led to a larger economic contraction than in
either Ireland or Portugal because Greece is a
relatively closed economy. In other words,
demand for Greece’s exports from abroad is very
low and imports are also relatively low, thus
recession negatively impacts domestic products
and services more than imports.
Together, these problems have led to a
greater economic contraction, worsening of
market sentiment, and increased insolvency
in the banking sector. The deficit in 2011 was
over 10 percent (“Greece: Request for . . . , p. 5),
much higher than the IMF’s original SBA pro-
jections, due to a “deeper than expected reces-
sion” with the economy shrinking by 5 per-
cent instead of the 3.8 percent estimated by
the EU and IMF in June (Nellas). In addition,
real GDP has declined by more than 13 per-
cent since 2009, significantly overshooting SBA
projections (“IMF Completes . . . ,” p. 5).
Greece’s previous finance minister Evangelos
Venizelos argues that the larger European
context should also be taken into account when
trying to understand Greece’s inability to re-
enter financial markets and its failure to meet
fiscal targets, claiming that Spain, Portugal, and
Italy have since acquired similar unsustain-
able debt loads of their own. Indeed, more Euro-
zone banks are also being downgraded by rating
agencies and facing shortages in liquidity, and
governments across Europe are facing similar
challenges in trying to attract investors for their
sovereign bonds.
Furthermore, the feeble progress of reform
has not improved investor sentiment and,
according to IMF reports, “reform momentum
has not gained the critical mass necessary to
begin transforming the investment climate”
(“Statement by . . .”), indicating that investor
confidence still remains low at a time when
Greece could greatly use more foreign direct
investment. Goals for privatization have fallen
slightly to the wayside due to uncertainty in
the valuation of state-owned assets and because
of more depressed market conditions, imply-
ing that the government will receive lower
revenues than expected (“Statement by . . .”).
Given this slow pace of reform, a plan to raise
€50 billion from privatization of state-owned
assets by 2015 was decreased to €35 billion by
2014 (“Statement by . . .”). In addition, current
Greek legislation, including the introduction
of new taxes such as Papandreou’s property
tax, and further wage and pension cuts, have also
prompted social discontent and led to nation-
wide strikes, a stark difference in public senti-
ment from 2009. Credit within Greece also
continues to tighten as deposit withdrawals
increase, and as more depositors are heading
toward banks in other EMU countries (Tsafos,
Greek Default Watch, 2011). Furthermore, over-
all progress for structural reforms has been
shaky despite initial progress in regulated pro-
fessions and licensing procedures. IMF officials
claim that a “reinvigoration of reforms remains
the overarching challenge” (“Statement by . . .”)
for Greek policymakers as they strive to push
past public disapproval.
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On the whole, the IMF’s bailout plan of
implementing drastic spending cuts and struc-
tural reforms to reduce Greece’s deficit and debt
burden has fallen short. Since 2009, these
austerity measures were initially resisted by Par-
liament because of the fear that they would slow
growth raise unemployment, and impose a large
deflationary effect on the Greek stagnant econ-
omy. In reality, the bailout plan has not caused
these effects; rather, they were already prevalent
in an uncompetitive and unproductive economy.
What the bailout has done, however, is mag-
nify the downturn in the Greek economy by
forcing the Greek government to implement
severe fiscal austerity measures that decrease
disposable income through heavy taxation and
wage and pension cuts. Admittedly, some of
these cuts are nevertheless necessary, especially
in Greece’s public sector. The bailout also
mandates structural reform that, if imple-
mented properly, may increase the effectiveness
and competitiveness of the Greek economy.
With a slowdown in the pace of reform, however,
and an increase in new measures to bring down
the deficit, the Greek government is focusing
more on short-term solutions rather than long-
term sustainability. It is no wonder that the
Greek government and the bailout plan are
often pointed to as the root cause of much of the
public’s discontent. The current difficulties fac-
ing Greece have also led to a political impasse
in the Greek government and in Europe, where
further action has been delayed, and threats
have been made to withhold further bailout
funds to Greece unless it takes more decisive
actions.
Since February 2012, plans have been set
for another €130 billion of further financing,
along with Greece’s debt restructuring, and two
European stabilization mechanisms known as
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)
and European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have
been established and funded (“About EFSF”).
A new treaty for greater fiscal regulation and
consolidation, known as the Fiscal Compact, has
also been formulated. However, there are still
concerns over whether the EFSF and ESM,
despite their increased lending capacity, are 
sufficient to deal with both the Eurozone’s
endangered banking sector and its highly
indebted members. What remains to be seen
is whether successful structural reforms will be
implemented and how long it will take Greece
to repay its debt without defaulting. Greece
must persuade the markets that it can not
only pass reform laws but also implement them
without causing excessive social upheaval. If
Greece is successful in these reforms, the coun-
try can slowly regain investors’ confidence
and achieve growth through the gradual return
of foreign investment. More importantly, the rel-
ative success of the IMF’s programs in Greece
will not only determine the turnaround of its
deteriorating economy, but it will also surely set
a precedent for other struggling economies such
as Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Italy. 
Second Agreement; Will it Work?
In early 2012, two years after the origi-
nal May 2010 agreement and four years of reces-
sionary economic activity, it was clear that
Greece was not going to be able to access inter-
national capital markets by 2013 as the original
programme envisioned. The new bailout agree-
ment, voted on and agreed to by EU finance
ministers and EU policymakers in February
2012, included considerable debt restructur-
ing along with substantial new bailout funds
of €130 billion. The main features of the pro-
gram included a voluntary agreement with
the private sector to restructure national debt
and a larger emphasis on internal devaluation
and “growth-enhancing” structural reforms as
the way to spur growth. Indeed, the most recent
IMF staff report on Greece highlights that
“resolving Greece’s balance-of-payments prob-
lem within the euro will require a shift in the
structural-reform strategy to directly priori-
tize internal devaluation.”
As a part of the debt restructuring with the
private sector, orderly write-downs meant that
Greek bonds lost relatively 75 percent of their
economic value (Taylor), but Greece’s outstand-
ing debt stock fell by €107 billion. This “hair-
cut” will help bring down Greece’s debt bur-
den as a proportion of GDP from its peak of
164 percent to 120 percent by 2020 (“The Euro
Crisis . . .”). In addition, Greece will receive €28
billion from the IMF, which will be disbursed in
17 installments of €1.65 billion, with the last
payment made in 2016. Members of the euro
area will provide €144.7 billion, which will not
need to be repaid before 2016 (“Greece: Request
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for . . .”). Moreover, Greece’s official creditors
agreed to reduce the interest rate for the loans
disbursed under the first Greek bailout program,
thereby reducing Greece’s cost of servicing its
debt by an estimated 1.4 billion (“The Euro Cri-
sis . . .”). By 2014, the goal is to have the pub-
lic sector own 69 percent of Greece’s public debt,
which is a significant transference of ownership
from the private sector. Seeing that there is
no need to repay its loans before 2016, it seems
that Greece has been given some much-needed
breathing space to service its debt. Indeed, the
IMF loans will not need to be repaid until
2026, and the Eurozone loans will likely come
due at a much later date.
Nevertheless, concern still runs high that,
despite the debt restructuring and lax debt
repayment schedule, the IMF’s stand-by agree-
ment seems overly optimistic in its hopes for an
internal devaluation. Even if such a devaluation
does occur, Greece still faces unsustainable debt
levels that could also undermine the goals and
policy targets of the programme. Policy tar-
gets and estimates for the Greek economy do
indeed seem optimistic: GDP is expected to
decline by 4.8 percent in 2012 before turning
positive in 2014; the government is forecasted
to run a deficit in 2012 before running surpluses
by 2013; and the debt-to-GDP ratio is meant to
fall from 163 percent of GDP in 2012 to 116.5 per-
cent of GDP by 2020 (“Greece: Request for . . .”).
The IMF forecasts that private consumption in
2012 will fall by 5.7 percent, followed by a
smaller contraction of 1.1 percent in 2013 and
modest growth thereafter (Tsafos, Greek Default
Watch, 2011). Exports are also projected to
increase by a 7 percent yearly average from 2013
to 2016. However, since exports fell by 20 per-
cent in 2009 and grew by only three percent
in 2010, it is difficult to imagine export growth
doubling in the forthcoming year unless there
is a significant overhaul in reform measures
or other developments (e.g., productivity
growth) that support exports (“Hellenic
National Reform . . .). Furthermore, the IMF
forecasts a 7.7 percent growth in investment
from 2013 to 2016 (Tsafos, “The Day After . . .). 
In order for this to happen, structural reforms
affecting the business environment need to be
efficiently implemented.
Essentially, these forecasted changes—the
fall in consumption, followed by increases in
export growth and investment—follow the
scenario of an internal depreciation that aims
to boost external competitiveness and long-term
growth. However, the IMF forecasts seem to rely
heavily on the rapid growth of exports and
investment, and on several unpredictable fac-
tors, including the Greek government’s ability
to implement and follow through with the
structural reforms it legislates. Even the IMF
acknowledges that “restoring competitiveness
by way of internal devaluation has proved to
be a difficult undertaking with very few suc-
cesses.” There is also the risk that an internal
depreciation will lead to a deeper recession
(especially if Greece falls behind on the afore-
mentioned forecasts). Faced with falling
incomes, yet increasing debt load thanks to
these new loans, Greece could once again stray
from its debt trajectory (i.e. 120 percent debt-
to-GDP ratio by 2020) and plunge itself fur-
ther into recession. The result would be another
failed bailout program, or the need for further
bailout loans in the future. 
In addition to the difficulties of achiev-
ing an internal devaluation, another problem-
atic factor that could forestall Greece’s path to
financial sustainability is public opinion. The
issue of whether an internal devaluation can
be achieved is also an issue that is inexorably
tied to the interaction of the Greek government
and the public. Beset with rising anti-auster-
ity sentiment on the one hand and a strug-
gling bureaucracy on the other, it is no won-
der that public opinion swayed against the
two dominant parties during the elections on
May 6, 2012 and again on June 17, 2012. Once
the dominant parties for over 30 years, PASOK
(the leading socialist party) and New Democracy
(the main conservative party) barely managed
to receive enough votes in the June 2012 elec-
tion to form a governing coalition (Donadio and
Kitsantonis, 2012). New Prime Minister Anto-
nis Samaras was compelled to form a three-
party coalition government with the newcomer
Democratic Left Party to prevent another elec-
tion where SYRIZA, a coalition of leftist par-
ties who are not in favor of the current bailout
agreement, might have won. The current frag-
mentation of the political system parallels
public sentiment about the failure of the first
memorandum and the ensuing recession.
Greece’s gross national product declined 20 per-
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cent since 2009 and unemployment is at an ago-
nizing 21 percent and rising. Meanwhile, prom-
ised labor reforms and privatization targets still
have not been efficiently implemented. Seeing
that Greece ranks 119th on the Heritage Foun-
dation-Wall Street Journal’s Index of Economic
Freedom (which places Greece lower than many
sub-Saharan countries), it is also clear that
Greece faces a large problem when it comes to
adhering to the “basic economic principles of
good economic policy” (Taylor).
With the growing recognition that the
Greek government lacks the confidence of its
people, the government must now convince the
public, and itself, that it can follow through with
the task at hand. If the coalition government
fails to pass the legislature necessary to carry
out the reforms outlined in the memoran-
dum, it would not only lose to its rival, SYRIZA,
but also put Greece in contempt of the Troika
agreement. Both of these outcomes could lead
to expulsion of Greece from the Eurozone. It
would thus be in Greece’s best interest to per-
severe on the path that the IMF has set out for
it and continue to implement reforms that
address the main problems of underlying com-
petitiveness and economic productivity rather
than look towards easy solutions such as tax
hikes and spending cuts, or even worse, an
exit from the Eurozone. With a recessionary
economy and high unemployment, Greece
can no longer afford to delay measures that
are needed to spur growth. With the rise in anti-
austerity sentiment, the government can use
this period as an opportunity to turn a new page
and focus on growth-enhancing structural
reforms. To pursue these reforms successfully,
the government needs to communicate effec-
tively to the public the importance of these
reforms in order to build a sustainable economic
foundation that will help steer the country
out of its debt crisis. While the elections in
May and June of 2012 exemplified public frus-
tration, they also paved the way for new politi-
cal strategies and a move away from the old
clientelistic tendencies of the old government.
If there is willingness in the Greek Parliament
to be open to new political ideas, then the cur-
rent uncertainty associated with the collapse
of the dominant political forces in Greece may
simply be an opportunity in disguise. Time is
running out, however, and the tables are now
turning on Spain and Italy, who are currently
facing ailing banking sectors, alarmingly high
bond yields, and escalating debt levels. The
Greek government must take decisive action
before its golden thread of life, like so many
tragic figures in Greek mythology, is also cut
prematurely by the fates.
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